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THE PUBLIC AUDIT (WALES) BILL  
Memorandum by Professor David Heald to the Public Accounts Committee 
INTRODUCTION 
1. I am grateful to the Committee for the opportunity to submit written evidence and then 
give oral evidence. Introducing myself, I am Professor of Accountancy at the University 
of Aberdeen Business School, with a longstanding research interest in public 
expenditure, public sector accounting and auditing. My practical engagement with these 
matters includes being: 
• specialist adviser on government accounting to the Treasury Committee of the House 
of Commons (1989-2010) 
• member of the Financial Issues Advisory Group which proposed the financial 
arrangements that were later enacted as the Public Finance and Accountability 
(Scotland) Act 2000 (1998) 
• specialist adviser to The Public Accounts Commission of the House of Commons 
(TPAC) (2002-08) 
• member of the Audit Commission’s Technical Advisory Group (2003-2010) 
• independent member of the Financial Reporting Advisory Board to HM Treasury, on 
the nomination of the UK Government’s Chief Economic Adviser (2004-09) 
2. It is relevant to the present matter that I resigned as specialist adviser to TPAC in July 
2008, so that I could publicly oppose the corporate model for the National Audit Office 
(NAO) that had resulted from the Tiner Report (2008). My criticisms of the audit 
governance arrangements that were later enacted by the Budget Responsibility and 
National Audit Act 2011 are expounded in Heald (2008, 2009). I later gave written and 
oral evidence to the Communities and Local Government Committee of the House of 
Commons, opposing the abolition of the Audit Commission and the complete 
outsourcing of local government and National Health Service (NHS) audits in England 
(Heald, 2011).   
3. I lack personal knowledge of Welsh public affairs and of the difficulties that have led to 
the provisions in the Public Audit (Wales) Bill. I am therefore heavily dependent on my 
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reading of publicly available material. However, there are generic issues about public 
audit arrangements that deserve consideration by the Committee. My concern is that the 
Bill proposes a permanent structural solution to a temporary conduct problem, for which 
there are proportionate remedies. ‘Something has to be done’ often leads to policy and 
institutional design mistakes. 
THE CHALLENGES OF PUBLIC AUDIT 
4. Public audit constitutes a difficult arena because it extends much further than the 
financial certification audit also undertaken in the private sector. Judgements about 
‘regularity and propriety’ and Value for Money (VfM) are central to the substance of 
modern public audit. VfM audit inevitably touches sensitive nerves in the triangular 
relationship between Legislature, Government and Audit Office. While VfM does not 
question policy, the line between what is policy and what is implementation is 
inevitably blurred. The issue of cost effectiveness (does the policy achieve declared 
objectives?) sits alongside that of worth-whileness (which is of fundamental interest to 
legislators and their electors but which Audit Offices address with difficulty). VfM 
audit comes behind policy implementation, so there is always the danger of wisdom 
derived from hindsight. Moreover, media and political attention will inevitably focus on 
criticisms, disregarding successes, thus creating an aura of negativity. Public audit is a 
delicate plant which has to be carefully nurtured. 
5. In this difficult context, the actual and perceived independence of an Auditor General 
are fundamental safeguards. In his/her work, an Auditor General must have 
independence not only from the Government but also from the Legislature because 
reports may include criticism of expenditure programmes and organisations that have 
strong support in the Legislature. There should be an open appointments procedure, a 
fixed term of between seven and ten years, restrictions on subsequent employment to 
the extent that the law allows, and a well-defined procedure for removal from office.   
6. Auditors General are ‘Officers of Parliament’, constitutional watchdogs of fundamental 
importance to democratic government (Gay and Winetrobe, 2008; Gay, 2011). The 
need to protect independence makes this role an isolating experience, thereby 
emphasising the importance of support arrangements that do not impinge on 
professional judgement.  
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7. In governance terms, the accountability of the Auditor General for Wales (AGW) 
should be to the Assembly as a whole, not to the Government or the governing 
majority. My reading of documentation in relation to the Public Audit (Wales) Bill is 
that the Government is in the driving seat, not the Assembly (Welsh Government, 2012, 
para 40). This is dangerous because Governments, at both ministerial and civil service 
levels, have incentives to constrain the operations of public audit. 
PROBLEMS AT THE WALES AUDIT OFFICE 
8. The reputation of the Wales Audit Office (WAO) was damaged by the events of 2010 
and 2011 (Public Accounts Committee, 2011). My reading persuades me that it would 
be wrong to attribute all the responsibility for this damage to the criminal conduct and 
managerial style of Mr Jeremy Colman, AGW from April 2005 to February 2010. 
9. Among the points that emerge from the publicly available documentation are the 
following: 
(a) Mr Colman’s term of office was extended in May 2009 so that he would serve an 
eight-year term, an indication of Assembly confidence in his record-to-date as the 
first full-time AGW 
(b) The International Peer Review (Gardner et al, 2009) gave a generally positive 
appraisal of the professional work of the WAO in October 2009, four and a half 
years after its creation. However, in both explicit and coded language, it noted 
dysfunctional relationships among senior management and an unsatisfactory human 
resources and industrial relations climate. While highlighting multiple challenges 
ahead, it rejected adoption of the corporate model then newly adopted by the NAO 
ahead of legislation. It recorded strong stakeholder support for the WAO, in marked 
contrast to stakeholder responses to the announced demise of the Audit 
Commission 
(c) The Internal Audit report (Wales Audit Office, 2011) on the conduct in office of Mr 
Colman is written in a hostile tone, criticising many aspects of his managerial style 
but making no reference to the context within which he was operating. In light of 
the signals about conflict among senior management contained in the International 
Peer Review (Gardner et al, 2009), it is regrettable that this report was not 
externally commissioned 
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(d) The National Audit Office (2010) report on the WAO accounts from 2005-06 to 
2009-10 makes dismal reading. This led to restatements in the 2010-11 accounts 
and a report to the Assembly by the Auditor General for Scotland (AGS) (Black, 
2011). While in no way excusing the egregious accounting and disclosure 
deficiencies at the WAO, the audit fees to a private firm in those years were 
minimal: £8,000 (2005-06); £9,000 (2006-07); £9,000 (2007-08); £10,000 (2008-
09); and £13,000 (2009-10). Not only are there exaggerated expectations of what 
financial certification audit can achieve but also top-tier audit firms do not bid for 
such work because they have, or may bid for, contracts with Audit Offices as 
outsourced audit suppliers. There are dangers in audits of Audit Offices being 
undertaken by audit firms without extensive experience of the specific requirements 
of HM Treasury’s Financial Reporting Manual. Audits of each other by Auditors 
General might be seen as a round robin. Robust internal review, including the 
technical department of an Audit Office, is therefore imperative: material errors 
once made will later lead to reputation-shredding restatements of accounts.  
10. On the basis of my reading, I conclude that: 
(a) the integration of NAO in Wales and Audit Commission in Wales was problematic; 
to what extent difficulties were ones of managerial and employee culture, 
professional judgement or incompatible personalities is something on which others 
might advise the Committee. The legacy of entitlements from previous employment 
will have complicated changes in senior management, not least in that departures 
would be expensive and controversial. Whereas Audit Scotland and the AGS were 
established in 1999,1 when there was a halo around devolution, the WAO and full-
time AGW were not created until 2005; this may have been a complicating factor. 
Hopefully, the present AGW will be able to resolve legacy issues  
(b) the impression is given of a large amount of time being spent on the internal 
machinery of public audit, possibly to the detriment of the delivery of public audit 
                                                 
1 The AGS is an office holder of the Scottish Parliament, appointed by Her Majesty, but not a corporation sole. Audit 
Scotland is a corporate body, whose statutorily defined membership is: the AGS; the Chairman of the Accounts 
Commission; and three other members appointed jointly by the AGS and the Chairman of the Accounts Commission 
(Public Finance and Accountability (Scotland) Act, Section 10(2)). 
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(c) proportionate internal governance mechanisms for the WAO are available, 
rendering the corporate model unnecessary as well as inappropriate 
(d) Assembly oversight of the AGW and WAO should be strengthened.  
PROPORTIONATE REMEDIES 
11. The independence of the AGW, in fact and in appearance, from the Government and  
the Assembly, is vital. The incumbent has three roles: corporation sole as AGW; Chief 
Executive of the WAO; and Accounting Officer. There are tensions between these roles 
which the incumbent must manage. In his written and oral evidence, the AGW has 
documented the ambiguities, tensions and inflexibilities that would arise from the 
proposed corporate board structure (Thomas, 2012). The arrangement confuses 
governance with executive functions, and oversight with advice. I could understand a 
proposal to abolish the corporation sole status of the AGW (though I would oppose it), 
but putting a corporate board on top is not strengthening governance but weakening it. 
In this case, two mechanisms are not better than one but risk the dilution of 
accountability.
2
 Boards can be oversight, executive or advisory. If the WAO is to have 
a board, this should be advisory, with executive authority in the hands of the AGW and 
oversight exercised by the Assembly (see paragraph 14 below). Advice should be given 
careful consideration, but the decision-making authority, together with accountability 
for decisions, should rest unambiguously with the AGW. 
12. I support what is labelled as Option 2 (Allow AGW to strengthen internal control 
arrangements) in the Explanatory Memorandum (Welsh Government, 2012). Although 
events make this a difficult point to sustain in public debate, the internal management 
of the WAO should be his/her responsibility. An Audit Office in a parliamentary 
democracy is not like a normal public sector service delivery organisation because of 
the paramount importance of protecting audit independence in relation to financial 
certification, regularity and propriety, and VfM. The roles of monitoring and advising 
do not mix. In my view, the proposals which the AGW put to the Committee on 7 
October 2010 largely address the identified deficiencies (Wales Audit Office, 2010a,b). 
                                                 
 
2
 In the case of the corporate NAO, Schedule 3 of the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011 governs the 
relationship between the NAO and the Comptroller and Auditor General. This requires a Code of Practice (National 
Audit Office, 2012). 
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There is an update in the 2011-12 Wales Audit Office (2012, pp. 64-65) Report and 
Accounts. 
13. The AGW should have a fixed, non-renewable term and there should be a clearly 
specified mechanism for removal from office for misconduct or under-performance. 
This power must be exercised by the Assembly as a whole and be subject to a strong 
super-majority requirement that protects the incumbent from removal by the 
Government of the day. In the bi-cameral UK Parliament, the requirement is a 
resolution of both Houses and in the unicameral Scottish Parliament, elected on 
proportional representation, a two-thirds majority of all members. Given that conflicts 
between the Government of the day and the AGW can be predicted, such protection is 
essential. Within the assurances provided by the statutory framework and oversight 
arrangements, the Assembly should trust or remove the AGW. 
14. The accountability of the AGW should run directly to the Assembly. There is a 
distinction between the oversight role (exercised at Westminster by TPAC) and the 
client role (the Westminster Public Accounts Committee (PAC) is the principal client of 
the NAO). During my 2002-08 specialist advisership, I felt that TPAC, whose active 
members were often also PAC members, tended to blur its oversight role with the more 
familiar client role. However, I agreed with the procedure through which TPAC 
approved the Corporate Plan and Estimates, and then the Chairman of TPAC presented 
the NAO’s Estimate to Parliament and answered Parliamentary Questions. The Scottish 
Parliament follows the Westminster arrangement, with oversight being by the statutory 
Scottish Commission for Public Audit consisting of Members of the Scottish 
Parliament. I understand that the small size of the Assembly at 60 Assembly Members 
(AMs) may have been a reason for not establishing a separate oversight body in Wales.  
However, the roles of client and oversight body that the Public Accounts Committee 
must presently fulfil can be incompatible. I therefore propose the establishment of a 
Welsh Commission for Public Audit, which might include a minority of external 
persons with relevant governance and financial knowledge and experience.
3
 There 
                                                 
3
 The post of Comptroller and Auditor General of Northern Ireland was established by the Government of Ireland Act 
1920. The present arrangements are described at http://www.niauditoffice.gov.uk/index/about-niao/governance-of-
niao.htm. There is an Advisory Board whose role is ‘providing objective and impartial advice to the C&AG to assist 
him in the discharge of his functions’. In the Northern Ireland Assembly, the client role is performed by the Public 
Accounts Committee and the oversight role is performed by the Audit Committee. 
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should be some overlap of membership with the Committee but those AMs should not 
dominate. 
SPECIFIC POINTS ABOUT THE MODEL OF THE CORPORATE BOARD 
15. The Government is placing too much confidence in reasonableness as a mechanism for 
resolving disagreements and conflicts between the AGW and the WAO. This is not 
something that could credibly be tested in the courts and, if it were, it would inflict 
reputational damage, provoke media mockery, and probably lead to resignations. 
Conflict might arise over:  
• how much VfM audit and performance measurement to undertake (note the drastic 
curtailment for local authorities and the NHS in England) 
• which areas of public expenditure should receive priority for VfM 
• resource requirements  
• the extent of reliance on outsourced audit providers, rather than the use of WAO 
employees (note the abolition of the Audit Commission and the outsourcing of its 
audit functions) 
Instead of speaking his or her mind to the Committee, the AGW might have to defend 
unsatisfactory compromises. This would be done in the knowledge that disagreements 
might leak to the media or be disclosed through Freedom of Information (FOI) requests. 
16. I have no knowledge of how the NAO arrangements are working. However, I would 
point to the proximity factor that affects public audit in the smaller polities of the 
Devolved Administrations, where there is more intense Legislature-Audit Office 
interaction than at Westminster. This intensifies the danger of compromising the 
AGW’s independence, or of such perceptions arising. In a small country like Wales, 
suitable candidates for Non-Executive roles will be well-known and could become 
subject to media, governmental or political pressure.  
17. Employee representation on an executive Board which exercises control over the AGW 
is entirely inappropriate. There are specific issues in the context of an Audit Office that 
do not apply to a normal public service delivery organisation. Such a Board member 
would also be seriously conflicted: for example, in relation to the industrial relations 
and human resources issues identified as problematic by the International Peer Review 
(Gardner et al, 2009), and to future reductions in workload and employment. If there 
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were leaks from the Board or ‘inspired’ FOI requests, suspicion might be pointed at the 
employee director. 
18. In his written and oral evidence the AGW (Thomas, 2012) has raised a number of 
practical obstacles to the implementation of the corporate board proposal (eg HM 
Revenue & Customs treatment of travel and subsistence expenses and the legal basis on 
which staff transfers would take place from the AGW to the corporate WAO). The 
resolution of these issues would have significant impacts on transition costs. Indeed, 
even without legislative change, legacy entitlements of staff from predecessor 
organisations will constrain the managerial freedom of the AGW. This might cause 
future controversy because of ‘pay-offs’, the amounts of which would be beyond the 
control of the AGW and WAO. 
CONCLUSION 
19. The International Peer Review (Gardner et al, 2009, p. 7) wrote of the WAO being at a 
watershed, in part due to expected reductions in financial audit work as machinery of 
government changes reduced the number of audited bodies. The reality has proved 
much more difficult.  
20. Media criticism of the expenses of the then UK Comptroller and Auditor General were 
the trigger for the corporate model being applied to the NAO. Rolling out a corporate 
model is a readily available option and the Budget Responsibility and National Audit 
Act 2011 constitutes a precedent. In my view, this model is inappropriate for Wales. 
21. Auditors should not expect to be popular, especially public sector auditors whose remit 
extends to VfM and organisational performance at a time when UK fiscal austerity is 
putting downward pressure on Welsh public expenditure.  Public sector organisations 
are inevitably exposed to media and political attacks on, for example, salaries and 
expenses. Good housekeeping is desirable for its own sake and imperative for 
reputation because of easy media headlines about ‘public sector fat cats’. However, the 
point needs to be made that the full-year salary of the present AGW in 2011-12 was 
£150,000 (Wales Audit Office, 2012, pp. 56), about 20% of the mean salary of a Big 4 
audit partner.  
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22. Rather than going ahead with this Bill, the Assembly should pass a limited measure 
which includes the establishment of a Welsh Commission for Public Audit. Legislation 
would not be required to establish an Advisory Board to advise the AGW in the 
discharge of his/her responsibilities, but it could be given a statutory basis. In the 
context of public audit arrangements, the AGW and WAO remain in the early years of 
their existence. The overriding need is to provide the AGW with the support he/she 
needs while being clear that this does not dilute either his/her independence of 
professional judgement or personal accountability to the Assembly for the performance 
of the WAO. 
Aberdeen, 2 October 2012 
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Submission to the 
Wales Public 
Accounts Committee 
from the C&AG 
Public Audit (Wales) Bill 
October 2012 
Introduction 
1 The session on 16 October provides the Committee with the opportunity to explore the 
practicalities of implementing the governance reforms proposed by the Public Audit (Wales) Bill, 
hereafter ‘the Bill,’ with me and to obtain my perspective on how these have worked in practice, 
based on my experience of implementing similar reforms under the Budget Responsibility and 
National Audit Act 2011.  
2 This paper explains the way the arrangements implemented under the Budget 
Responsibility and National Audit Act (BRANA), with respect to the Comptroller and Auditor 
General and the National Audit Office work in practice, and provides a summary of the 
differences between the BRANA and the Bill. 
Budget Responsibility & National Audit Act 2011 
3 The Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act (BRANA), which received Royal Assent 
in March 2011, makes provision about the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG), 
establishes the National Audit Office (NAO) as a body corporate and sets out the relationship 
between the C&AG and NAO. The Act took full effect from 1 April 2012, setting the NAO’s 
governance on a statutory basis.   
4 The Act reflects the unique statutory position of the NAO, balancing the need for 
appropriate controls and oversight, while preserving the independence of the Comptroller and 
Auditor General.   
5 The key requirements of the Act are: 
· the C&AG to be appointed by letters patent for a fixed, non-renewable, term of 10 years; 
· the NAO Chair to be appointed by letters patent for a term of up to three years, renewable 
once; 
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· the composition of the NAO Board, and the requirement for non-executive members to be 
appointed by The Public Accounts Commission (TPAC); 
· creating the NAO as a corporate entity for the first time; and 
· making provision for the role of the NAO Board. 
The Role of the NAO Board 
6 The Board’s role is defined by the Act, and given practical application through the Code of 
Practice.  Further information on the provisions of the Code of Practice can be found below. 
7 The Board has five non-executive members and four executive members.  Non-executive 
members are appointed for a fixed term, agreed by TPAC. The C&AG is a permanent member 
of the Board and the other Executive members are appointed for a fixed term by the non-
executive members, upon the C&AG’s recommendation.   
8 There is a clear division of responsibility between the Chairman and the C&AG; the 
Chairman is responsible for the leadership and effective working of the Board and the C&AG is 
the Chief Executive of the NAO and is responsible for developing and implementing the NAO 
strategy. 
9 The NAO Board agrees the strategy and resource estimate of the NAO, and submits them 
to TPAC for approval; it also provides support and independent advice to the C&AG in 
exercising his functions and overseeing the management of NAO resources.   
10 In practical terms the Board: 
· provides effective challenge in driving improvements in the NAO’s operations, and brings 
increased rigour and discipline in decision making; 
· provides support to the C&AG and other members of the Leadership Team; and 
· brings insight from the wider experience of the non-executive members to inform the 
thinking of the NAO and support improvement. 
11 The Board is supported by two committees, both of which consist solely of non-executive 
members: 
12 Audit Committee - The Audit Committee, as part of its work on risk management and 
internal controls considers the governance of the NAO, informed by the Board’s annual 
assessment of its own performance. 
13 Remuneration Committee - The Remuneration Committee has a formal role in 
determining the executive Board members remuneration, except for that of the C&AG which is 
determined by the Prime Minister and Chair of the Committee of Public Accounts.  It also 
advises on remuneration and reward issues for the wider NAO. 
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Provisions of BRANA & the Code of Practice 
14 BRANA sets out at a high level the role of the Board and the relationship between the 
Board and the C&AG.  The Act requires that the NAO prepare a Code of Practice, approved by 
TPAC, setting out in more detail the relationship between the C&AG and the NAO Board.  The 
aim of both documents is to protect the audit independence of the C&AG while establishing the 
remit of the Board in the following areas: 
· The NAO Strategy: the C&AG prepares the strategy, which the Board considers and 
approves, subject to any modifications it considers appropriate.  The strategy is submitted 
to TPAC jointly by the C&AG and Board Chairman.  The strategy contains a bid for the 
resources required. 
· The Work Programme:  The C&AG prepares a programme of statutory work (C&AG 
approved services) for each financial year.  The Board considers this programme, and 
may offer advice on the balance of the programme, but decisions on the final programme 
will be taken by the C&AG. The NAO Board is not able to amend the budget set out by the 
C&AG for the services carried out by the C&AG under his statutory responsibilities. 
· The NAO approved services (previously the non-statutory work programme):  the 
Board has more authority regarding the programme of NAO approved services.  The 
C&AG develops a programme of work which the Board then considers, making any 
additions or removing any items it deems appropriate, before approving the programme 
and resources required.   
· The Estimate:  for each financial year the C&AG will determine the budget required for 
the programme of statutory work as a prior claim on the overall resource envelope 
approved by TPAC as part of the strategy.   
· The C&AG also makes proposals to resource the programme of NAO approved services, 
which the Board considers, making any amendments it deems appropriate.  The C&AG 
has the discretion to decline to carry out a particular piece of work within the programme 
of NAO approved services when he considers the budget approved by the Board to be 
insufficient. 
· Monitoring the carrying out of the C&AG’s functions: the Board is responsible for 
monitoring the delivery of the approved work programme, and outturn against approved 
budgets.  The Board may provide advice to the C&AG.  To support it in this responsibility 
the Board receives regular management information from the NAO, and an annual report 
from the NAO’s external auditor. 
Key differences between the Bill and BRANA 
15 Annex 1 below sets out a detailed comparison between the draft Bill under scrutiny by the 
Committee and provisions set out under BRANA. 
16 The key differences identified are: 
· Tenure: The tenure of the C&AG is 10 years, whereas the Bill proposes a maximum 
tenure for the Auditor General for Wales (AGW) of 8 years (both non-renewable). 
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· AGW Code of Audit Practice: The AGW must issue a Code of Audit Practice prescribing 
the way in which his functions are to be carried out. There is no equivalent requirement 
placed on the C&AG. 
· Regard to proposals made by the Public Accounts Committee: Under Clause 18 of 
BRANA, in determining whether to carry out a Value for Money examination, the C&AG 
must have regard to proposals made by the Committee of Public Accounts. There is no 
equivalent clause in the draft Bill under scrutiny. 
· Audit of Local Government Bodies: Clause 11 of the Bill provides that the AGW must 
audit the accounts of local government bodies in Wales. In respect of local public bodies in 
England, this is currently the remit of the Audit Commission. The current draft Local Audit 
Bill, published 6 July 2012, proposes that the audit of local public bodies in England will, 
going forward, be undertaken by private sector auditors in line with a Code of Audit 
Practice issued by the C&AG which shall prescribe the way in which local auditors are to 
carry out their functions.   
· Oversight: under BRANA, the Public Accounts Commission performs key oversight 
functions such as the appointment and removal of non-executive Board members, 
approval of the scheme relating to the charging of fees, specifying what offices or 
positions a former Comptroller and Auditor General must consult with the Commission on 
prior to taking up, review and approval of the NAO’s estimate of resources and approval of 
the NAO and C&AG’s strategy. BRANA also specifies areas where the Chair of the 
Committee of Public Accounts has a role, for example his/her agreement is required in 
order to appoint the C&AG. Under the proposed Bill, the oversight of the WAO and AGW 
is performed by the National Assembly. 
· Code of Practice dealing with the relationship between the C&AG and NAO: under 
Schedule 3 clause 10 of BRANA, the C&AG and NAO are required to jointly prepare a 
code of practice dealing with the relationship between the NAO and C&AG, a provision on 
which the draft Bill is silent. 
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ANNEX 1 
Comparison between the reforms implemented in respect of the NAO and 
C&AG and those proposed for Wales  
Figure 1 below provides a summary of the similarity and differences between the provisions as 
set out in the draft Bill, currently under scrutiny by the Committee, and those set out under 
BRANA which took full effect from the 1 April this year. 
Overall, there is much in common between BRANA and the provisions of the draft Bill, however 
there are also some notable differences, as set out below.  
Figure 1 
Comparison between the provisions of the Public Audit (Wales) Bill 
and BRANA 
Summary of the provision per Public Audit 
(Wales) Bill 
Summary of the provision per Budget 
Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011 
Clause 2: the Auditor General for Wales (AGW) is 
appointed by Her Majesty on the nomination of the 
National Assembly. No nomination is to be made 
unless the National Assembly is satisfied that 
appropriate consultation has taken place with such 
bodies as represent the interests of local 
government in Wales. 
Clause 11: the C&AG is appointed by Her Majesty 
on a motion made by the Prime Minister who must 
have the agreement of the Chair of the Committee 
of Public Accounts. 
There is no reference to consultation with other 
parties. 
Clause 2: the person appointed holds office for up 
to 8 years and may not be re-appointed. 
Clause 11: the person appointed holds office for 10 
years and may not be re-appointed. 
Clause 3: A person appointed as AGW may be 
removed from office by Her Majesty at the AGW’s 
request, on the grounds of medical incapacity, or 
on the grounds of misbehaviour if recommended 
by a vote of the National Assembly. 
Clause 14: the C&AG may resign from office or be 
removed by Her Majesty on an address of both 
Houses of Parliament. 
Clause 4: The AGW may not be a member of any 
legislature in the UK nor hold any office appointed 
by or on behalf of the Crown, National Assembly or 
National Assembly Commission. 
Clause 12: The C&AG is an officer of the House of 
Commons, may not be a member of the House of 
Lords and may not hold any office appointed by or 
on behalf of the Crown 
Clause 5: A former AGW must consult with such 
person specified by the National Assembly before 
taking up a position of a description specified by 
the National Assembly.  
For 2 years after ceasing to be AGW: the former 
AGW may not hold a position appointed by or on 
behalf of the Crown, National Assembly  or 
National Assembly Commission; and they may 
also not provide services to the Crown, National 
Assembly, National Assembly Commission, or a 
statutory auditee of the AGW.  
Clause 15: A former C&AG must consult with such 
person as specified by TPAC on taking up an 
appointment or position of a description as specified 
by TPAC. 
For 2 years after ceasing to be C&AG, the C&AG 
may not hold an office appointed by or on behalf of 
the Crown, nor be a member/director, officer or 
employee of a body whose accounts are required 
under statute to be audited by the C&AG or open to 
inspection by the C&AG. 
Clause 6: the AGW continues to be a corporation 
sole. 
Clause 12: the C&AG continues to be a corporation 
sole. 
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Clause 7: the remuneration arrangements for the 
AGW are made by the National Assembly, who 
must first consult the First Minister. No element is 
to be performance based. The AGW’s 
remuneration is to be charged on the Welsh 
Consolidated Fund. 
Clause 13: Remuneration arrangements are made 
jointly between the Prime Minister and the Chair of 
the Committee of Public Accounts. No element is to 
be performance based.  The C&AG’s remuneration 
is to be charged on the Consolidated Fund. 
Clause 8: the AGW has complete discretion as to 
the manner in which the functions of his/her office 
are exercised and is not subject to the direction or 
control of the National Assembly or the Welsh 
Government. However, the AGW must aim to carry 
out his duties efficiently and cost-effectively and 
with regard to the standards and principles that an 
expert provider of accounting or auditing services 
would be expected to follow. 
Clause 17: the C&AG has complete discretion in the 
carrying out the functions of his/her office, including 
determining whether to carry out a value for money 
examination and the manner in which such 
examination is to be carried out. However, the 
C&AG must aim to carry out his duties efficiently 
and cost-effectively and with regard to the standards 
and principles that an expert provider of accounting 
or auditing services would be expected to follow. 
Clause 9: the AGW may do anything conducive to, 
incidental to, or to facilitate the carrying out of any 
of his/her functions.  
 
 
However the AGW may not do anything which is, 
or could become, the responsibility of the WAO. 
Clause 16: the C&AG may provide services to any 
person in any place within or outside of the UK 
under agreements or arrangements entered into by 
the C&AG. Schedule 3 (3) requires NAO approval 
for these. 
 
No equivalent requirement. 
Clause 10: Code of audit practice – the AGW must 
issue a code of audit practice prescribing the way 
in which his/her functions are to be carried out. 
No equivalent requirement. 
No equivalent requirement. Clause 18: In determining whether to carry out a vfm 
examination the C&AG must have regard to 
proposals made by the Committee of Public 
Accounts.  
Clause 11: the AGW must audit the accounts of 
local government bodies in Wales. 
No equivalent clause. In England this is currently the 
remit of the Audit Commission. The current draft 
Local Audit Bill proposes that the audit of local 
bodies in England is to be undertaken by private 
sector auditors in line with a Code of Audit Practice 
issued by the C&AG. 
Part 2, relationship between the Wales Audit Office 
(WAO) and AGW - Clauses 13, 14 and 15: 
establishes the WAO as a body corporate, 
provides powers for the WAO to do anything to 
facilitate or which is incidental or conducive to the 
exercise of any of its functions, and states that the 
WAO must aim to carry out its functions efficiently 
and cost-effectively. 
Part 2, National audit – clauses 20 to 23: 
establishes the National Audit Office as a body 
corporate, states that the NAO must aim to carry out 
its functions efficiently and cost effectively and sets 
out that the NAO’s expenditure is to be funded from 
Parliament.  
 
 
 
Clause 16 states that the AGW is to be the Chief 
Executive, but not an employee, of the WAO. 
Schedule 2, Part 3 (11) states that the C&AG is to 
be the Chief Executive, but not an employee, of the 
NAO. 
Clause 17 sets out the relationship between the 
AGW and WAO. It specifies that the WAO must 
monitor the exercise of the AGW’s functions and 
may provide advice where appropriate, to which 
the AGW must have regard. 
Schedule 3 (clauses 4 and 5) sets out the same in 
respect of the NAO and C&AG. 
Clause 19 provides that arrangements may be 
made between the WAO and a public body for the 
Whilst the C&AG may provide services to any 
person, in any place, by agreement (clause 16). 
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exercise by the WAO, or by the AGW, of functions 
of the public body (including a Minister of the 
Crown or government department). This also 
includes the provision of administrative, technical 
or professional services to, or for the purposes of 
the functions of the relevant public body by the 
AGW. 
(Clause 26, mentioned below, sets out that the 
AGW must prepare and submit an Annual plan to 
the WAO of the AGW’s (entire) work programme 
and resources estimate. The WAO may approve or 
reject it on the basis of unreasonableness) 
There is no equivalent provision in BRANA for the 
NAO or C&AG to exercise any of the functions of 
another public body. 
However, work performed under this category must 
be approved by the NAO – Schedule 3 clause 3 
(referred to as NAO-approved services) 
 
NAO approval applies to the non-statutory work of 
the C&AG as opposed to all of it. 
Clause 20 specifies the preparation of an estimate 
of the income and expenses of the WAO and the 
submission to, and oversight by the National 
Assembly. Consultation with the AGW and WAO is 
required before modification of the Estimate by the 
Assembly. 
 
Clause 21 specifies that the WAO must provide 
resources to the AGW for the exercise of his/her 
functions. Clause 18 provides  that the AGW has 
the power to delegate his/her functions but the 
scheme of delegation must be approved by the 
WAO. 
 
Clause 30 provides for the indemnification of the 
AGW and WAO against a liability in consequence 
of breach of duty. 
Clause 23 specifies the submission to, and 
oversight by the Public Accounts Commission of the 
estimate of NAO’s use of resources. No consultation 
is required under statute in respect of modifications 
the Commission sees appropriate to make. The 
Commission must have regard to any advice given 
to it by the Treasury or Committee of Public 
Accounts.  
Schedule 3, clause 2 specifies that the NAO must 
provide resources for the C&AG’s functions. 
Powers to delegate the C&AG’s functions are 
granted by sch 3, clause 6, subject to approval of 
the scheme of delegation by the Public Accounts 
Commission. 
Clause 24 indemnifies the C&AG and NAO against 
a liability in consequence of breach of duty. 
Clause 24 Scheme for charging fees – fees 
received by the AGW must be paid to the WAO. 
The WAO may charge fees in accordance with a 
scheme approved by the National Assembly. The 
requirements set out in this clause are more 
prescriptive than those set out in BRANA, 
including for example a requirement to list the 
enactments under which the WAO may charge a 
fee. 
Schedule 3 clause 8 allows the NAO to charge fees 
in accordance with a scheme approved by the 
Public Accounts Commission. Any fees received by 
the C&AG must be paid to the NAO. 
Clauses 25-28, Annual Plan, requires that an 
annual plan be agreed between the AGW and 
WAO each financial year covering the planned 
work programme for the AGW and the WAO as 
well as the planned use of resources, including the 
maximum amount available for the AGW’s 
programme. This must be laid before the National 
Assembly.  
 
Clause 26 of the Bill states that the AGW must 
submit an Annual Plan to the WAO setting out the 
AGW’s (entire) work programme and an estimate 
of the maximum amount of resources required to 
undertake it. The WAO may reject the statement if 
all or part of it is considered unreasonable.  
 
Whilst the WAO and AGW are not bound by the 
plan, they must have regard to it. 
Schedule 3, clause 1 sets out the requirement for 
the NAO and C&AG to jointly prepare a strategy for 
the national audit functions, to be reviewed annually, 
that sets out the use of resources for the national 
audit functions and the maximum available for the 
exercise of the C&AG’s functions. The strategy must 
be jointly submitted by the C&AG and NAO Chair to 
the Public Accounts Commission for approval.  
 
There is no equivalent provision under BRANA 
where the NAO could reject the C&AG’s statutory 
work programme, or the maximum resources 
required, on the basis of unreasonableness. 
 
 
The NAO and C&AG must each give effect to the 
strategy. 
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Schedule 1 of the Bill sets out the membership of 
the WAO: 7 members of whom 5 are non-
executives (including the Chair), the AGW and one 
executive member. 
The Chair and other non-executives are appointed 
by the National Assembly. The National Assembly 
must first consult the First Minister before 
appointing the Chair.  
 
 
The National Assembly may make remuneration 
arrangements for the Chair and non-executives but 
no element of these arrangements may be 
performance based. 
 
Non-executives are appointed for a maximum of 4 
years, and cannot be re-appointed more than 
once. Restrictions may be imposed on the non-
executives in terms of other offices or positions 
held, including for a maximum of two years after 
ceasing to be a non-executive member of WAO. 
 
The National Assembly may terminate the 
appointment of a non-executive member if, for 
example, they have been absent for more than 
three months, are unfit or have failed to comply 
with the terms of their appointment. Before 
terminating the appointment of the Chair, the First 
Minister must be consulted. The National 
Assembly may terminate the appointment of the 
Chair if he/she has failed to comply with the terms 
of appointment, or is unwilling to carry out the 
functions of the Chair. 
Executive members are appointed by the non-
executives on the recommendation of the AGW, or 
if not, another person of the non-executives’ 
choosing. 
Schedule 2 of BRANA specifies that the NAO is to 
have 9 members of whom 5 are non-executives 
(including the Chair), the C&AG and three NAO 
employees. 
The Chair is appointed by Her Majesty exercisable 
on an address of the House of Commons, the 
motion for which must be moved by the Prime 
Minister. To do so the Prime Minister must have the 
agreement of the Chair of the Committee of Public 
Accounts. Other non-executives are appointed by 
the Public Accounts Commission.  
The Prime Minister and Chair of the Committee of 
Public Accounts may jointly make remuneration 
arrangements for the NAO’s Chair. The Public 
Accounts Commission may make arrangements for 
the remuneration of other non-executive members. 
Non executives are appointed for a maximum 3 year 
term, and cannot be re-appointed more than once. 
Restrictions may be imposed on non-executives 
whilst holding office and afterwards, with no 
maximum time limit imposed by the legislation. 
 
Her Majesty may terminate the Chair’s appointment 
on an address of both Houses of Parliament. The 
Public Accounts Commission may terminate the 
appointment of other non-executives if, for example, 
they have been absent for more than three months, 
are unfit or failed to comply with the terms of their 
appointment. 
Part 3: the WAO may pay the AGW additional 
payments of allowances or other benefits to cover 
expenses properly and necessarily incurred in 
his/her capacity as a member and Chief Executive 
of WAO. 
Not specifically mentioned in the legislation.  
Part 5 covers employees of WAO and sets out that 
an individual may not be an employee if 
disqualified from appointment under Part 6. The 
Part includes requirements for recruitment and 
specifies that appointment procedures and the 
terms of employment should be broadly in line with 
members of staff of the Welsh Government and 
that employees of WAO may not hold any office or 
position appointed by, or on behalf of the Crown, 
National Assembly or National Assembly 
Commission. 
Part 5 to Schedule 2 simply states that the NAO 
may employ staff, that terms of appointment should 
be broadly in line with those applying to civil 
servants and that employees may not hold any 
office or position appointed by, or on behalf of the 
Crown. 
Part 7, Procedural rules, sets out that WAO must 
make rules for the purpose of regulating the 
WAO’s procedure, quorum for meetings and that 
Part 6, Procedural rules, is very similar to Part 7 of 
the Public Audit (Wales) Bill.  The only difference is 
that there is no explicit mention of the power for the 
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the rules may include provision for the setting up of 
committees. There is also the power to apply 
different quorums for different circumstances. 
rules to provide for different quorums for different 
situations. 
Schedule 2, Part 1, requires the WAO and AGW to 
jointly prepare two interim and one annual report 
on the exercise of the functions of the AGW and 
WAO. These must be laid before the National 
Assembly. 
 
Part 2 of Schedule makes provision for the WAO 
to designate, with the agreement of the National 
Assembly, an individual to temporarily exercise the 
functions of the AGW if the situation is vacant, the 
AGW is unwilling or unable to discharge the 
functions of his/her office, or on the grounds of 
misbehaviour. 
The individual temporarily designated must be an 
employee of WAO and the designation may not 
exceed six months, but could be extended for a 
further six months.  
Schedule 3: the C&AG and NAO must jointly 
prepare and review an annual strategy on the 
national audit functions for approval by the Public 
Accounts Commission. 
There is no specific requirement for interim reports. 
 
Under schedule 3 clause 7, if the Speaker of the 
House of Commons certifies to that House that, in 
the view of the Speaker, the C&AG is seriously 
impaired from carrying out the functions of his office 
due to ill-health, then, the NAO, with the agreement 
of the Public Accounts Commission, may authorise 
an employee of NAO to carry out the C&AG’s 
functions for not more than six months. 
No equivalent requirement. Schedule 3, clause 10, requires the NAO and C&AG 
to jointly prepare a code of practice dealing with the 
relationship between NAO and the C&AG. 
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1. Introductions, apologies and substitutions  
1.1 The Chair welcomed the Members and members of the public to the meeting, 
emphasising how pleased he was that the meeting was being held in Llangollen. 
 
1.2 Apologies had been received from Julie Morgan. 
 
 
2. The Welsh Government's acquisition and action to dispose of the 
former River Lodge Hotel, Llangollen - Evidence from Powys Fadog  
2.1 The Chair welcomed Pol Wong, Chief Executive and Chairman, Powys Fadog. 
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2.2 The Committee questioned the witness. 
 
Action point: 
 
Powys Fadog agreed to provide: 
 
• Further information on when martial arts classes ceased on the premises of the 
former River Lodge Hotel; 
 
 
3. The Welsh Government's acquisition and action to dispose of the 
former River Lodge Hotel, Llangollen - Evidence from Amanda Brewer  
3.1 The Chair welcomed Amanda Brewer to the meeting. 
 
3.2 The Committee questioned the witness. 
 
4. The Welsh Government's acquisition and action to dispose of the 
former River Lodge Hotel, Llangollen - Evidence from former 
Accounting Officer  
4.1 The Chair welcomed Gareth Hall to the meeting. 
 
4.2 The Committee questioned the witness. 
 
Action points: 
 
Gareth Hall agreed to provide: 
 
• Further information on briefings provided to the relevant Minister with regard to 
the proposals by Clwyd Alyn Housing Association to use the site of the River 
Lodge Hotel. 
• Clarity on whether there had been other examples of the Welsh Development 
Agency / Welsh Government failing to conduct an independent red book 
valuation for land acquisitions. 
• Clarity on when the compliance review was comissioned. 
• An email received from Amanda Brewer’s line manager, outlining the nature of 
her role on the board of Powys Fadog and assurances that the conflict of interest 
was being managed effectively. 
 
5. Papers to note  
5.1 The Committee noted the minutes of the previous meeting. 
 
6. Motion under Standing Order 17.42 to resolve to exclude the public 
from the meeting for the following business:  
Item 7. 
 
7. Consideration of evidence on the Welsh Government's acquisition 
and action to dispose of the former River Lodge Hotel, Llangollen  
7.1 The Committee discussed the evidence received on the Welsh Government’s 
acquisition and action to dispose of the former River Lodge Hotel, Llangollen. 
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